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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several recent sovereign defaults on foreign currency denominated debt – the 1994-1995 Mexican-peso crisis,
the 1997 Asian currency crisis, the 1998 Russian ruble devaluation and the 2001 credit failure in Argentina –
have increased the ﬁnancial institutions’ concerns about their risk exposure to emerging markets. Credit mi-
gration analysis plays today a major role in risk management, valuation and international capital allocation.
Financial institutions and regulators use ratings to feed VaR models (e.g. JP Morgan’s Credit Metrics), to
price risky loans and to determine concentration limits. Furthermore, the New Basel Accord (Basel II, 2001)
permits banks to use internal ratings to set the regulatory capital against their credit exposure. Finally,
credit ratings are key inputs to prominent models for the term structure of credit spreads (Jarrow et al.,
1997) and the pricing of credit derivatives (Kijima and Komoribayashi, 1998). All these applications require
a mapping of rating histories into transition probability estimates.
The amount of debt defaulted and the subsequent scale of losses in recent sovereign crises have by far
exceeded those of corporate defaults. In this context, the application of extant risk management approaches
to sovereigns warrants particular attention. Sovereign migration modeling is fraught with diﬃculties, mainly
because of data limitations – the rating samples are relatively small both in the time-series and cross-
section dimensions. The accurate estimation of migration probabilities requires enough transitions from each
rating category which makes the task rather challenging for low credit-quality issuers (emerging markets)
because, until very recently, ratings were mainly produced for industrialized countries. All these issues raise
concerns about the reliability of sovereign rating migration measures. One alternative is to employ samples
of corporate bond ratings which have a much longer history. This presumes that the sovereign credit
migration process resembles that of corporates but the empirical evidence reveals signiﬁcant discrepancies
between them. Jackson and Perraudin (2000) ﬁnd that, on average, sovereign credit spreads are substantially
smaller than those of equally rated corporates. Cantor and Packer (1996) ﬁnd that sovereign ratings exhibit
more discrepancies across agencies than corporate ratings. Nickell et al. (2000) show that the transition
probabilities of US industrials diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of equally rated sovereigns.
The usual framework for modeling rating migration is a discrete time-homogeneous Markov process. This
approach is relatively coarse in that it disregards the exact timing of rating changes and the duration in each
rating. The discrete multinomial estimator, typically adopted by leading rating agencies (Carty and Fons,
1993) and in most of the academic literature (Bangia et al., 2002), produces zero probability for unobserved
2transitions by construction. For corporate ratings, Lando and Skodeberg (2002) illustrate how continuous
hazard rate methods are able to provide non-zero probability for unobserved transitions (e.g. default from
Aa). These risk measures are of consequence because such transitions can actually occur. Basel II implicitly
supports this argument by setting a minimum probability of 0.03% for such rare events. Furthermore, a
positive risk weight is assigned for sovereigns rated Aa to Baa which implies that Basel II recognizes the
possibility of default from these ratings. On the other hand, the homogeneity assumption refers to the
migration risk being constant over time which, although simpliﬁes estimation, is clearly questionable. Time
heterogeneity is a stylized fact of corporate rating migrations and it has been attributed either to momentum
and duration eﬀects or to business cycle dependence. Several studies address the hypothesis of rating drift
or momentum in corporate ratings which implies that prior rating changes have predictive power for the
direction of future changes. Downgrade momentum in corporate ratings is supported by Altman and Kao
(1992), Carty and Fons (1993), Altman (1998), Kavvathas (2001), Bangia et al. (2002) and Lando and
Skodeberg (2002). The duration eﬀect refers to the relationship between the time spent in a given rating and
the transition probability. Lando and Skodeberg (2002) and Kavvathas (2001) both conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings
by Carty and Fons (1993) on the presence of duration eﬀects in corporate ratings but the evidence on the
sign of the relationship is mixed. The impact of business cycles on default risk for speculative bonds has
been documented in Wilson (1997), Nickell et al. (2000), Kavvathas (2001) and Bangia et al. (2002).
To our knowledge, only two studies in the literature investigate the estimation of sovereign credit migra-
tion risk and both consider discrete approaches. Wei (2003) proposes a multi-factor Markov chain model
that accommodates time heterogeneity but recognizes the limitations of the model for sovereign debt due to
the small samples available. Hu et al. (2002) use sovereign default data in conjunction with bond ratings
to overcome the small-sample problem in a homogeneous ordered probit framework. Very little is known
on the ﬁnite-sample properties of credit migration estimators in the context of sovereigns. There are two
studies available that conduct a comparison of estimators (Jafry and Schuermann, 2004; Christensen et al.,
2004) but their focus is on corporate debt. One goal of this paper is to contrast diﬀerent estimators of
sovereign rating transition risk. In this regard, the study has two motivations. First, the extensive evidence
that sovereign and corporate credit ratings behave diﬀerently prompts the thought that a given estimator
may have diﬀerent properties in these two scenarios. For instance, there is consensus that corporate rating
transition probabilities are time-varying and therefore hazard rate methods that allow for this heterogeneity
3are superior. However, this has not been established for sovereigns as yet. Second, given that sovereign
ratings are subject to less frequent transitions than corporate ratings, continuous methods are expected to
be more accurate and eﬃcient than discrete ones. Another goal is to test for the presence of two types of
non-Markovian eﬀects in the rating histories known as momentum and duration dependence.
The analysis is based on a sample of Moody’s credit ratings 1981-2004 for 72 industrialized and emerging
economies. The paper compares a discrete multinomial estimator widely used in the literature and two
continuous hazard rate estimators which diﬀer in that one imposes the time-homogeneity assumption whereas
the other relaxes it. A metric based on the transition matrix’s spectral decomposition is used to gauge the
overall rating migration risk implied by these estimators. A bootstrap simulation framework is adopted to
compare the ﬁnite-sample bias and variance of the estimators. Particular attention is paid to two issues.
One is to what extent continuous (versus discrete) estimation brings eﬃciency gains in small samples. The
other is how important it is to account for time heterogeneity in the rating process.
The contribution of this study to the credit risk literature is threefold. First, it investigates the relative
value of continuous-time estimators that use the full information of exact transition dates and rating dura-
tions. Second, it addresses the issue of whether assuming time homogeneity results in credit risk measures
with relatively large small-sample bias and eﬃciency loss. Third, it provides the ﬁrst tests for the presence
of momentum and duration dependence in sovereign ratings, both of which suggest non-Markov eﬀects or
non-time homogeneity. For this purpose, we employ spectral analysis and panel logit models. We ﬁnd that
the continuous, hazard rate estimators produce more reliable default probability estimates than the discrete,
multinomial estimator. The time-homogeneity assumption leads to too small (underestimated) sovereign
default probabilities and larger migration risk is implied upon relaxing it. Furthermore, there are signiﬁ-
cant downgrade momentum and duration eﬀects in the sovereign rating process, consistent with the extant
evidence on corporate ratings. These ﬁndings have implications for risk management and capital allocation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the Markov process and the three estimators. Section
3 presents the data. Section 4 discusses the bootstrap experiments for the comparison of estimators and the
main ﬁndings. Section 5 investigates the properties of the rating process. A ﬁnal section concludes.
42M e t h o d o l o g y
The mainstream literature on credit migration rests on two premises. First, the future rating only depends
on the current rating and is independent of the rating history (Markovian property). Second, the transition
probabilities are constant over time (homogeneity property). The Markov process can be described as follows.
Let i =1 ,2,...,Kdenote the available credit ratings. Moody’s bond rating system has seven coarse states
(Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, C), twenty three ﬁner states (Aaa1, Aaa2, Aaa3, Aa1,..., Ca) plus the default (D)
state. We adopt the broader scale (K =8 )and so i =1is the highest (Aaa) rating with i =8denoting
default. Let P(s,t) be the K ×K transition probability matrix driving the continuous Markov chain so that
pij(s,t)=P r ( ηt = j |ηs = i) ,s < t (1)
is the probability that a sovereign rated i at time s is at j at time t.I ft h eM a r k o vc h a i ni shomogeneous,
then the probabilities only depend on the transition horizon (∆t = t−s) but not explicitly on time and thus
there is a family of matrices, P∆t, indexed by ∆t. The transition matrix becomes (P∆t)n for horizon n∆t.1
T h et r a n s i t i o nm a t r i xf o rah o m o g e n e o u sM a r k o vc h a i no v e rao n e - p e r i o d( i . e .∆t =1 )horizon is denoted
P = {pij} for i,j =1 ,...,Kwith entries pij ≥ 0 and
￿K
j=1 pij =1for all i. Default is treated as an absorbing
state and so pKK =1(for K =8 )by construction. The counterpart matrix for a heterogeneous Markov
chain is denoted P(s,t). The remainder of this section discusses three alternative estimators of transition
matrices and the bootstrap framework adopted to approximate their sampling distribution.
2.1 Discrete Multinomial (DM) Estimator
The conventional approach to the estimation of P discretizes the above Markov process and assumes time
homogeneity. This leads to the discrete multinomial (DM) estimator based on annual migration frequencies.
Transitions from a given state i =1 ,2,...,K to another state j over a one-year horizon are assumed to follow
a multinomial distribution with K −1 outcomes and associated probabilities pij,i￿= j. Let Ni(t) denote the
number of sovereigns that start year t in state i and Nij(t,t+1 )the number of those that have migrated to
j by the start of year t +1 . The annual migration frequency from i to j is calculated as
Nij(t,t+1)
Ni(t) .
Let us assume homogeneous, Markov chain dynamics for the rating process. Accordingly, the maximum
1See Norris (1997) for an in-depth discussion of Markov chains.
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Ni(t) ￿T
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Ni(t) , the sample average of the year-on-year
migration frequencies (Bangia et al., 2002; Hu et al., 2002). The latter coincides with (2) when the number
of sovereigns that start year t at rating i remains constant over the sample period, Ni(t)=Ni, meaning
that the annual rating inﬂow is assumed equal to the outﬂow. Estimator (2) neglects information about
within-year rating transitions and rating duration. In the context of sovereigns, where rating transitions are
scarce, it is crucial to exploit the full information. This motivates the following estimators.
2.2 Homogeneous Hazard Rate (HHR) Estimator
Let the generator or intensity matrix of a continuous Markov chain at time t be denoted by Λt = {λij(t)}
for i,j = 1,...,K where the oﬀ-diagonal transition intensity
λij(t) ≡ lim
∆t→0+
pij(t ≤ τi ≤ t +∆t | τi ≥ t)
∆t
≥ 0 (3)
is deﬁned as the instantaneous (at time τ = t) rate of transition from rating i to rating j conditional upon
surviving in state i up to time t and λKj(t)=0for all j. The diagonal element
λii(t) ≡ λi(t) ≡ −
K ￿
j=1,j￿=i
λij(t),i ￿= j (4)
is the hazard rate function or the instantaneous rate of transition away from i at time t, conditional upon
being in state i up to time t (the minus sign denotes outﬂow from rating i). Thus the probability of leaving
rating i over an arbitrary time horizon ∆t is equal to λi(t)∆t. The transition intensity λij is driven by
process τi, the duration or survival time in rating i, which is subject to censoring or discontinuation at both
e n d so ft h es a m p l e–right (left) censoring means that the duration of each issuer in a given rating after
the end (before the start) of the sample is unknown.
In order to estimate Λ under the assumption of independent durations, the contribution to the overall
transition probability for rating i of each possible duration or, equivalently, transition is accounted for (i.e.
from i to j, j ￿= i). The contributions of Nij migrations (or durations) from state i to state j occurring
6at times tm, m = 1,...,Nij,a n do fNic censored durations (at rating i) occurring at tm, m = 1,...,Nic, are






































If the intensities are homogenous, Λt =Λ , maximisation of the log-likelihood logLi with respect to λij gives






where Nij(T) is the number of transitions from i to j, (i ￿= j), within the window [0,T] such that the total
number of countries in rating i within this period is Ni(T)=Nij(T)+Nic(T). Estimator (5) can be rewritten
as ˆ λij =
Nij(T) ￿ T
0 Yi(u)du where Yi(u) is the number of sovereigns rated i at time u and so the denominator gives
the total time spent in state i by all the sampled sovereigns. The homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
of the transition probabilities over horizon ∆t is2
ˆ P =e x p (ˆ Λ∆t), ∆t ≥ 0 (6)






The continuous (hazard rate) estimator, equation (6), has several advantages over the discrete (multino-
mial) counterpart, equation (2). First, suppose that a country’s rating evolution is Aaa−→Aa−→ Aw i t h i n
the horizon of interest (say ∆t =1year), then the transition to Aa contributes to the estimation of the tran-
sition probabilities from Aaa to Aa and from Aa to A through (5) but not through (2). Second, it accounts
for the exact date when a sovereign receives a new rating and also for each rating duration. In the above
example, the time spent in the intermediate state Aa is accounted for in the estimation of the transition
intensity ˆ λij for i = Aa. Third, it readily accommodates right censoring stemming from rating withdrawals
by using information for the obligors up to the withdrawal day. Thus obligors ending the year as withdrawn
ratings will not be discarded as in the DM estimator. Fourth, it generally yields non-zero probabilities of
rare transitions between states, even if they are not observed in the sample, as long as an indirect transition
from one state to the other occurs. The DM estimator would yield zero for these unobserved transitions. For
instance, suppose that no direct defaults from state Aa are observed but there are migrations Aa−→Ba n d
2It is only under homogeneity that a simple mapping from transition intensities to transition probabilities exists. A detailed
exposition of failure time analysis can be found in Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002).
7from B to default. Then as long as the probability of migrating to B and the default probability from B are
both non-zero, the continuous estimator yields a non-zero default probability for Aa. Finally, the transition
intensities can be easily transformed into transition probabilities over any time horizon.
2.3 Non-Homogeneous Hazard Rate (NHHR) Estimator
The nonparametric approach of Aalen and Johansen (1978) extendsthe discrete estimator (2) to a continuous-
time estimator that allows for heterogeneity in the underlying Markov process. Let P(s,t) be the rating
transition matrix over horizon [s,t] with entries as deﬁned in (1). Assuming N transitions occur within [s,t],




[I +∆ˆ A(Tm)] (7)
where the time point Tm ∈ [s,t] denotes a transition occurrence, N is the total number of transitions (i.e.
the number of days where at least one transition occurs) and
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(8)
where ∆Nij(Tm) is the number of transitions from state i to j at time Tm. The diagonal entries ∆Ni.(Tm)
are the number of transitions away from state i at time Tm so that each row sums to zero and the rows of
I+∆ ˆ A(Tm) sum to 1. The number of sovereigns in state i just before Tm is denoted Yl(Tm). The oﬀ-diagonal
entries {∆ ˆ A(Tm)}ij, i ￿= j, represent the fraction of sovereigns rated i just before Tm that migrated to rating
j at Tm. The Aalen-Johansen method can be cast as the DM estimator (2) extended to inﬁnitely short-time
intervals (i.e. to each point of time, Tm). Finally, a long-run average transition matrix can be obtained as
ˆ P = w0 ˆ P(t0,t 1)+w1 ˆ P(t1,t 2)+... +wT−1 ˆ P(T −1,T) (9)
where ˆ P(tk,tk+1),k =0 ,...,T − 1 are particularizations of (7) for sequential, non-overlapping intervals
(tk,tk+1) and wk is the proportion of rated countries at tk.
82.4 Rating Mobility Measures
O n ek e ya s p e c ti nt h ea n a l y s i so fc r e d i tr i s ki st h eo v e r a l lr a t i n gmobility or dynamics as opposed to stability
– these two attributes refer to the oﬀ-diagonal and diagonal probability mass of a transition matrix, re-
spectively. Mispredicting the oﬀ-diagonal probabilities and especially, the default risk entails large economic
costs. In the literature, this comparison has been mostly based on Euclidean distances (Israel et al., 2001;
Bangia et al., 2000) and indices of mobility for Markov matrices based on eigenvalues and determinants
(Shorrocks, 1978; Geweke et al. 1986). A pitfall of these mobility metrics is that they cannot provide a clear
signal with matrices that have large concentration of diagonal mass, a feature which is typical of sovereign
data. To circumvent this problem we employ Jafry and Schuermann’s (2004) mobility estimator.
The dynamic part of the system or overall mobility matrix is given by ˜ P = P − I where the identity
matrix I represents a stable (no migrations) system. The Jafry-Schuermann estimator is






ei( ˜ P ￿ ˜ P)
￿
(10)
whereei( ˜ P￿ ˜ P) is the ith eigenvalue of ˜ P ￿ ˜ P. Given the mobility matrices ˜ PA and ˜ PB, themetric ∆m( ˆ PA, ˆ PB)=
m( ˆ PA) − m( ˆ PB) captures the concentration of oﬀ-diagonal probability mass. If ˜ PA and ˜ PB have identical
diagonal values, the conventional diﬀerential metrics in the literature are simply zero irrespective of the oﬀ-
diagonal entries but this perverse eﬀect does not occur in ∆m( ˆ PA, ˆ PB). When the oﬀ-diagonal probability
is diluted across a number of entries, then (10) is smaller than when it is concentrated in a few positions.
2.5 Bootstrap Distribution of Rating Migration Estimators
Testing hypotheses and constructing conﬁdence intervals on rating migration risk requires the estimators’
sampling distributions. In order to derive the variance-covariance of the transition matrix estimator (6),
asymptotic theory is needed to obtain not only the variance-covariance of the intensity matrix ˆ Λ but also
that of the matrix exponential exp(ˆ Λ∆t). Unfortunately, there is no simple closed-form expression for these
variance-covariance matrices. The asymptotic distribution of the mobility diﬀerential estimator ∆m( ˆ PA, ˆ PB)
is also unknown. Moreover, the sovereign rating histories available have relatively few transitions and so
relying on asymptotic theory may be inappropriate. To circumvent these problems, we deploy Christensen
et al.’s (2004) bootstrap approach to approximate the estimators’ sampling distributions as follows.
The discrete (DM) and continuous (HHR) estimators are compared through the following experiment.
9First, the observed ratings are used to estimate the intensity matrix and one-day transition probability ma-
trix, Λ and P =e x p ( 1
365Λ), respectively. The probability estimates, {ˆ pij}, are adopted as ‘true’ parameters
of the bootstrap data generating process (DGP). More speciﬁcally, the rating histories of the various obligors
are conceptualized as realizations of a continuous, homogeneous Markov process. We thus construct R boot-
strap samples, {Bj}
R
j=1 , each of them containing the same number of sovereign histories, N, as the observed
sample.3 Each sovereign’s lifetime h and initial rating X0 are also as in the sample.
The bootstrap daily rating histories are constructed as follows. For a given sovereign, suppose that
X0=Baa and that the estimates for the transition probability from rating Baa to Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B,
Ca n dDa r eˆ p41, ˆ p42, ˆ p43, ˆ p44, ˆ p45, ˆ p46, ˆ p47 and ˆ p48, respectively, with
￿8
j=1,j￿=4 ˆ p4j = 1. Eight cumulative
probability ranges are formed, one for each possible transition from Baa. The ﬁrst range is (0, ˆ p41]. Summing
ˆ p41 and ˆ p42 gives the cumulative probability that the migration is either to Aaa or Aa and hence, the second
range is (ˆ p41, ˆ p41 +ˆ p42]. The third range is (ˆ p41 +ˆ p42, ˆ p41 +ˆ p42 +ˆ p43] and so forth. The daily rating X1
is obtained by randomly drawing from a uniform distribution, r ∼ i.i.d.U[0,1], and matching this draw ˆ r1
with one of the probability ranges. For instance, if ˆ r1 ∈ (ˆ p41 +ˆ p42, ˆ p41 +ˆ p42 +ˆ p43] then X1 = A. Another
random draw ˆ r2 gives X2 and so forth over the sovereign’s lifetime h so that {X1,...,X h} is obtained. This
simulation is conducted independently for the remaining N − 1 sovereigns to construct the ﬁrst bootstrap
sample, B1, that contains N rating histories, each with length hi,i = 1,2,...,N. This procedure is then
iterated to obtain R bootstrap data sets {Bj}
R
j=1. Finally, each Bj is translated into N rating transition
histories and durations which, using equation (2), yield the DM one-year transition matrix estimate ˆ Pj –
thus we obtain R transition matrix estimates from the DM approach. Likewise, using equation (6) we obtain






, is constructed in a similar manner. See Appendix A for details.4
The homogeneous (HHR) and non-homogeneous (NHHR) hazard rate estimators are compared through
similar experiments. However, in order to introduce year-on-year heterogeneity in the DGP, we estimate
annual intensity and probability matrices, ˆ Λt and ˆ Pt = exp( 1
365 ˆ Λt),t = 1,2,...,T on the basis of the observed
3There is no agreement in the credit risk industry on whether the ratings are cross-sectionally independent. S&P (2001)
argue that their rating transitions over the recent past are country speciﬁc. In this paper, we build on the evidence in Wilson
(1997), Nickell et al. (2000), Christensen et al. (2004), and Stefanescu and Tunaru (2005) and conceptualize the rating histories
of the various issuers as independent. While this assumption can be disputed, for the purpose of our analysis the key issue is
to employ the same bootstrap design for all the estimators under study.
4The paper appendices are downloadable from the author’s website – web address to be inserted after the journal refereeing
process is complete. The referees were sent copies of the Appendices.
10ratings.5 Then using ˆ Pt, an artiﬁcial daily rating history is obtained (as detailed above) for each sovereign
per year. In order for this heterogeneity to be reﬂected in the estimators’ properties, a transition horizon
∆t > 1 year is required. We choose ∆t =2years as the horizon of interest and thus compute a sequence
of HHR biannual transition matrices by deploying equation (6) over the 1982-1983, 1984-1985,..., 2002-2003
periods. Likewise, by means of equation (7), a sequence of NHHR matrices is obtained. Finally, the long
run average formulae (9) where (tk,tk+2),k =0 ,...,T−2 are 2-year periods is deployed with each sequence
to construct a pair of 2-year transition matrices, the HHR and NHHR estimates, respectively.
The estimators’ empirical distributions are used to construct conﬁdence intervals and to test hypotheses.
One can assess the estimators’ ﬁnite-sample bias by comparing the mean of their distribution with the ‘true’
parameter value in the bootstrap DGP. Following Efron and Tibshirani (1993) we adopt R = 1000.6
3T h eD a t a
The data is from Moody’s Default Risk Service. The credit ratings represent Moody’s assessment on the
risk that a borrower will fail to honour any debt payment – structural features of the debt issues such
as maturity, coupon structure, collateralization and seniority are all taken into account. The sovereigns
sampled are those with foreign-currency bonds rated by Moody’s some time during March 5, 1981 through
March 4, 2004. Thus the rating histories of the N = 72 sovereigns in the sample have diﬀerent lengths
hi,i = 1,2,...,N. The inputs for the discrete (DM) estimator are the credit ratings observed on the 5th
March, taken as the start of each 12-month window, whereas the continuous (HHR, NHHR) estimators are
based on the exact timing of each transition and the duration in each rating. Moody’s occasionally assigns
diﬀerent ratings to bonds of the same issuer depending on characteristics.7 In order to convert the sovereign
bond rating histories into a single sovereign rating history, we record for each issuer the lowest rating on
senior unsecured bonds which have not yet matured or been repaid. The latter is the most meaningful
indicator of a sovereign’s likelihood of default on any of its bonds (Moody’s, 2003).
According to Moody’s, a sovereign default occurs when a country misses payments on any of its foreign-
5It seems sensible not to introduce heterogeneity across shorter periods than one year for two reasons. First, the generator
ˆ Λt estimated over 6 or 4 month periods would be highly inaccurate because few sovereign transitions are generally observed in
such short intervals. Second, the stylised stability of sovereign ratings suggests that within-year homogeneity is plausible.
6In order to assess whether 1000 replications guarantee convergence of the bootstrap, we performed two sets of 500 simula-
tions. These gave empirical distributions that are virtually identical and comparable to that from the larger sample.
7For instance, Russia’s ‘MinFin’ US dollar bonds have been generally rated lower than its Eurodollar bonds. During the
1999 Russian crisis, defaults occurred on the former but not on the latter.
11currency rated bonds. Moody’s does not have a ‘default’ rating as such but instead records default dates –
the current rating (e.g. Caa) represents the severity of the default. For each country, we treat the date of the
ﬁrst default announcement as the default date – these are 17/08/98 (Russia), 30/11/98 (Pakistan), 25/08/99
(Ecuador) , 20/01/00 (Ukraine), 7/09/00 (Peru), 13/06/01 (Moldova), 30/11/01 (Argentina) and 15/05/03
(Uruguay). In order to identify the pre-default rating, we track the rating sequence up to the default date
and throw out the transitions that occurred very close (within a month) to it. For instance, Ukraine was
downgraded from Caa3 to Ca at day t−15 in default event time and so the pre-default rating is Caa3 as the
downgrade clearly reﬂected a pending default. Appendix B reports the number of foreign-currency sovereign
bond issuers rated by Moody’s from 1981-2004 in Panel A and provides a breakdown according to issuer’s
characteristics (geographical location, state of the economy and credit quality) in Panel B. Unlike emerging
economies, most industrialized countries have ratings from the start of the sample (March, 1981).
The initial date of the rating history or left censoring varies across sovereigns. The same applies to
the termination date or right censoring. The latter can occur either at the end of the sample window (i.e.
March 4, 2004) or at an earlier point due to withdrawn rating (WR) or default. A sovereign receives a
WR when bonds have matured, been repaid or called. The latter often reﬂects the issuer’s temporary exit
from the public bond market rather than having negative credit implications (Carty, 1997). WRs are rather
scarce because sovereigns, as opposed to corporates (due to merger or liquidation), rarely retire all their
debt simultaneously – only 5 countries in the sample have experienced a WR. We follow the literature
and exclude the WRs from the history of a sovereign (right censoring). When the rating is resumed, the
latter will be treated as a new issuer. Likewise, any rating assigned between the default date and the end
of the default episode is discarded. The sovereign is treated as a new issuer when the default episode ends,
deﬁned as the date when the sovereign exceeds the B3 rating.8 Half of the 8 defaulted countries (Pakistan,
Peru, Russia and Ukraine) recover from default and reappear in our sample as new issuers whereas the rest
(Argentina, Ecuador, Moldova and Uruguay) remain in default until the end of the sample window.
Finally, the analysis is focused on the eight ratings used by Moody’s prior to 1982 (i.e. Aaa to C plus
default and hence, a sub-rating such as Baa1 is labelled Baa) for two reasons. First, in the context of
the sparsity of data for sovereigns this reduces the number of parameters to be estimated and increases the
sample size of transitions per rating. Second, the reliability of ﬁner rating transition estimates is questionable
8This procedure is equivalent to treating default as an absorbing state.
12in credit risk applications and so the coarse rating system has become the industry standard.
Thus the eﬀective sample 1981-2004 for the analysis has 81 rating histories, 4 pertain to countries that
re-emerged from default and 5 to countries with a WR. Figure 1 displays the distribution of aggregate ratings.
[Figure 1 around here]
Investment grade sovereigns represent 70% of the sample. Appendix C provides summary statistics on the
distribution of credit ratings per year. Overall, the sample comprises a total of 759 country-year cases and
104 rating transitions. A discrete estimation approach (that ignores within-year migrations) exploits only
80 of these 104 cases which means discarding 23% of the observed migrations.9
4 Properties of Transition Probability Estimators
This section ﬁrst analyzes the discrete and continuous estimators for a 1-year transition horizon. Second,
the latter is increased to 2 and 3 years and the sample estimates are compared. Third, the added value of a
time-heterogeneous approach to credit risk estimation is assessed. As explained in Section 2.5, for the latter
purpose we introduce year-on-year heterogeneity in the bootstrap DGP and then consider 2-year transition
matrices as the estimation object. The discussion focuses primarily on the probabilities of default (PD) for
each rating and on the overall mobility or migration risk implied by the transition matrices.10
4.1 Discrete versus Continuous Estimators
One-year Transition Horizon
In the discrete (DM) approach, the entry pij of the 1-year transition probability matrix P is estimated
through (2). In the continuous (HHR) approach, the entry λij of the intensity matrix Λ is estimated
through (5) and ˆ P is obtained as the matrix exponential of ˆ Λ (horizon ∆t =1year) for a 6th order Taylor
expansion (k = 6). Table 1 reports the DM and HHR transition probabilities.
[Table 1 around here]
9The only empirical study available on sovereign transition matrix estimation, Hu et al. (2002), adopts a discrete-time
framework and so it exploits only 26 of S&P’s rating transitions during 1981-1998.
10The main inputs for portfolio credit risk and capital allocation models are the default probability estimates.
13The DM estimates are very similar to those reported by Moody’s (2003). Both the DM and HHR matrices
are diagonally dominant (rating stability) implying that the migrations are typically towards neighbouring
ratings. Larger volatility (transition between distant ratings) is associated with lower credit ratings such as
Ba, B and C. Another common aspect is that for any given rating i (or ith row) the transition probabilities
decrease as one moves farther from the diagonal – this is known as row monotonicity and is a stylized
feature of credit rating migration matrices (JP Morgan, 1997; p.73). A violation of monotonicity occurs for
the B rating: there is a higher probability of migrating to default than to C. This perverse eﬀect, which is
more prominent in the DM matrix, may stem from the noisy nature of the data for the low B rating.
The HHR estimator yields non-zero probabilities for transitions that are absent in-sample whereas for such
cases, the coarser DM estimator yields zero by construction. In the HHR matrix the oﬀ-diagonal probability
mass is spread over nearly all ratings whereas in the DM matrix it is concentrated around the diagonal. In
particular, it is noticeable that for low ratings the HHR transition matrix reﬂects greater migration volatility
than the DM counterpart. These diﬀerences suggest that the continuous estimator better captures the rating
dynamics. Moreover, the default probability for rating C in the DM matrix (ˆ pC,D = 16.7%) is relatively
low as compared to that in the HHR matrix (28.9%). This diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that the
coarse DM estimator does not use information on rating duration. For instance, if a sovereign is rated B
at year beginning then is downgraded to C and eventually ends the year in default, the discrete estimator
will only account for the overall migration from B to D. In contrast, the full transition history B→C→D
together with the duration in C will be exploited by the continuous estimator. The duration in C is short (in
most sample cases below 1 year as this is just a transitional status toward D) which implies a large default
intensity ˆ λC,D and hence, this explains the relatively large HHR default probability for rating C.
Next we compare the small-sample properties of the DM and HHR estimators through the bootstrap
framework presented in Section 2.5. The bootstrap DGP is a time-homogeneous, continuous Markov chain
with ‘true’ parameter values the historical (HHR) transition probabilities. Since the main focus is on default
risk, the last column of the transition matrix (Table 1) is highlighted in bold to signify the true probabilities of
default (PD). Figure 2 plots the Gaussian kernel density estimate of the simulated PDs for investment grade
ratings. The bold vertical line signiﬁes the true PD and the two dashed lines indicate the 95% conﬁdence
interval. For the three top ratings (Aaa, Aa, A), the estimates from the coarse DM approach are zero for
all bootstrap rating histories and so are not plotted. Table 2 reports the true PDs in the bootstrap Markov
14chain alongside summary statistics for the empirical distribution of the DM and HHR estimators.
[Figure 2 and Table 2 around here]
For the three top ratings, the distribution of the HHR estimator is roughly exponential with 97.5th percentiles
of 1.23 × 10−5bp, 0.0009bp and 0.238bp, respectively, and means quite close to the true PDs (small bias).
Although direct transitions to D from top ratings are unobserved in the current (and bootstrap) histories, the
HHR estimator is able to provide a plausibly small but non-zero probability for such rare events. Regarding
rating Baa, the DM estimator produces a zero PD for most histories and a PD in the range [60, 125]bp for
a few histories (Figure 2) which leads to a rather high 97.5th percentile of 75.2bp. In sharp contrast, the
97.5th percentile for the HHR estimator is 9.72bp, suggesting a marked eﬃciency gain as compared to the
coarser DM estimator.11 Our analysis serves to assess the adequacy of the minimum probability at 3bp that
has been established by the Basel Committee for unobserved events. This probability clearly falls in the
95% conﬁdence interval of the HHR estimator for rating Baa while it is well beyond the 97.5th percentile
for Aaa, Aa and A. Hence, the Basel II threshold appears too conservative for these higher ratings.
The empirical distribution of the PD for the lower ratings Ba, B and C are shown in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 around here]
Direct defaults from B are the most likely and relatedly, the DM estimator has a smooth distribution only
for rating B. For rating B, the DM and HHR estimators have a 95% conﬁdence interval of similar width but
the latter is more eﬃcient (tighter conﬁdence interval) for ratings Ba and C. The trimodal distribution of
the HHR estimator for Ba may be because there are three main transitions from Ba in the sample. One is
the Ba→Baa upgrade with 6.76% probability, another is the Ba→B downgrade with 8.55% probability and
third, a direct default with 0.08% probability. Since these probabilities are the true parameter values in the
bootstrap DGP, simulated histories following the upgrade (downgrade) contribute to the left (right) peak
of the PD distribution and those with direct default transition contribute to the middle peak. Regarding
small-sample bias in the PD parameters (diﬀerence between the distribution’s median and the bootstrap
DGP parameter), the HHR estimator shows less bias than the DM estimator for high credit-quality ratings
and rating C whereas the opposite holds for ratings Ba and B.
11The higher DM percentile is because about 2.5% of the simulated paths contain at least one default from Baa. If one default




Baa)=1 1 2and 1/112 is roughly 75.2bp.
15We now assess the statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in the DM and HHR default probabilities. For this
purpose, we conduct two-sided bootstrap tests for H0: PDHHR−PDDM = 0. Table 3 (Panel A) summarises
the empirical distribution of the diﬀerential statistic (￿ PDHHR − ￿ PDDM).
[Table 3 around here]
The 95% conﬁdence interval contains zero thus suggesting insigniﬁcant diﬀerences. The exception is rating
A for which the DM estimator gives always a zero default probability because no direct transitions A→Da r e
observed in the sample. However, the more eﬃcient HHR estimator gives a non-zero probability because it
exploits the full information that there are transitions A→Ba and A→Baa together with Ba→Da n dB a a →D.
These ﬁndings suggest that the DM estimator may underperform the HHR estimator for some mid ratings.
Finally, we test for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the overall ratings mobility (or migration risk) implied by
the DM and HHR estimation methods. Table 3 (Panel B) provides the historical mobility diﬀerential, ￿ ∆m,
as well as summary statistics for the estimator’s bootstrap distribution. The migration risk implied by the
DM transition matrix is higher than that from the HHR matrix and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
as suggested by the 95% conﬁdence interval not containing zero. This suggests that the concentration of
probability mass at oﬀ-diagonal positions in the DM transition matrix is higher than that in the HHR
counterpart. Upon closer inspection of Table 1, it is apparent that the DM matrix is relatively more sparse
(large number of zero entries) and, in particular, the mass is largely concentrated in those few ratings for
which transitions have been observed in the sample (i.e. around the diagonal). These results are consistent
with the discussion in Section 2.4, namely, that a few large oﬀ-diagonal terms can inﬂate the m( ˜ P) metric
considerably. The HHR matrix has not only higher default probability mass (sum of last column entries)
than the DM matrix but this mass is also spread over a larger number of ratings.
Two-year and Three-year Transition Horizon
One would expect a larger contrast between the DM and HHR estimators as the transition horizon increases
because the latter captures better the more marked rating activity. Table 4 presents the probability estimates.
[Table 4 around here]
The diﬀerences are striking for the lower ratings – the DM estimate suggests zero default risk from rating
16C whereas the HHR probabilities are 38.18bp and 35.49bp for the 2- and 3-year horizons, respectively.12 A
non-zero probability of default from C over a relatively long horizon of 2 or 3 years is rather plausible. The
upshot is that the DM approach underestimates the default probability for the highly risky sovereigns. On
the other hand, the DM estimate of the default probability from Baa is about twenty-fold the HHR estimate
– the 2-year default probabilities from the DM and HHR estimator are 192bp and 9bp and the 3-year ones
are 333bp, 22bp, respectively. The smaller default risk for Baa suggested by the HHR estimator is more
plausible because sovereigns spend relatively long times in the mid Baa rating (large duration as compared
to other ratings) on their way up and down the rating scale – the latter is captured in the denominator
of equation (5) which pulls down the default probability for Baa. Regarding overall mobility, it turns out
that the DM estimator yields relatively high measures, m( ˜ P), as compared with the HHR estimator for all
horizons ranging from 1 to 3 years. Again this stems from the large concentration of probability mass in a
few oﬀ-diagonal positions. Unsurprisingly, the diﬀerential ￿ ∆m( ˜ PDM, ˜ PHHR) increases with the time horizon.
These diﬀerences arejust a reﬂection of pitfallsin discreteversus continuousestimation of rating migration
risk, namely, larger small-sample biases and ineﬃciency of the former because of neglecting information on
ﬁner migration activity (within the horizon of interest) and rating durations. In sovereign credit risk analysis,
where ratings data are very sparse, it is crucial to account for as much information as possible.
4.2 Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous Estimators
The importance of allowing for time heterogeneity in the estimation of sovereign rating-transition proba-
bilities has not been investigated as yet. To ﬁll this gap, we compare the homogeneous (HHR) and non-
homogeneous (NHHR) hazard rate estimators. In order to approximate the estimators’ sampling distribution,
bootstrap rating histories are obtained from a DGP with year-on-year heterogeneity as described in Section
2.5 – the longer the transition horizon ∆t, t h em o r ep r o m i n e n tt h et i m eh e t e r o g e n e i t yw i l lb ea n ds ot h e
estimation focuses on 2-year and 3-year transition matrices. Accordingly, a sequence of biannual transition
matrices is obtained by deploying equation (6) over non-overlapping 2-year periods and the HHR transition
matrix is constructed via the issuer-weighted long run average (9). We proceed similarly over 3-year periods
to construct the HHR estimate of the 3-year transition matrix and so forth. Likewise, we obtain the NHHR
12The unit probability estimates from the DM approach, ˆ pC,B =1and ˆ pC,Ba =1(for the 2- and 3-year horizons, respectively),
stem from one transition – Romania migrates from C to B after 2 years and to Ba after 3 years. All other C-rated issuers have
durations shorter than 2 years and so their rating dynamics cannot be captured by the coarse discrete estimator.
17estimate of the 2-year and 3-year transition probability matrices by ﬁrst deploying equation (7) sequentially
and then by averaging the matrix sequences through (9). As explained in Section 2, the NHHR estimator
captures heterogeneities within the estimation window (∆t) whereas the HHR estimator neglects them.
Table 5 reports the HHR and NHHR transition probability estimates and overall mobility measures.
[Table 5 around here]
All credit ratings are subject to greater migration according to the NHHR matrix – larger oﬀ-diagonal
probability mass in each row or equivalently, per rating. In particular, the NHHR estimator generally
implies greater default risk. As one would expect, increasing the transition horizon exacerbates the diﬀerences
between the HHR and NHHR default probabilities. The ￿ ∆m statistic increases with the transition horizon
suggesting also that the contrast in the implied migration risk widens with the estimation window.
We now compare the bootstrap distribution of the two estimators. To preserve space, the discussion
focuses on the 2-year probabilities of default (PD). Figure 4 reports the kernel density of the estimated
probabilities (over replications) for investment-grade issuers. The summary statistics are in Table 6.
[Figure 4 and Table 6 around here]
For ratings Aaa and Aa, the estimated PDs are zero for all bootstrap samples and so the kernel density is not
plotted – the true PDs are zero because neither direct nor indirect transitions to default are observed over
2-year periods in the actual (Moody’s) sample.13 For ratings A and Baa, the true PDs are non-zero and both
estimators produce smooth distributions. The NHHR estimator yields zero default probabilities for rating
A with most simulated samples and just a few probabilities in the range (0,2]bp, giving a 97.5% conﬁdence
band of 0.45bp. Similarly, the corresponding percentile for the HHR estimator is 0.43bp, rendering the
two comparable in terms of eﬃciency. For the Baa category, the 95% conﬁdence interval is again virtually
identical for both estimators. For these two ratings, the comparison in terms of bias gives mixed results
depending on which measure (mean or median) is used.
Figure 5 plots the kernel density of the simulated PDs for non-investment grade issuers.
[Figure 5 around here]
13The true PDs are obtained from Moody’s sample by ﬁrst estimating annual transition matrices using (5) and (6). Second,
a sequence of 2-year transition matrices is obtained by multiplying each consecutive pair of annual matrices. The long run
average matrix obtained from this sequence through (9) provides the parameter values, or true PDs, for the bootstrap DGP.
18For the NHHR estimates, the densities are smooth and centered at the true value (c.f. true PD and mean
PD; Table 6) with the exception of rating C. In contrast, the density of the HHR estimates suggests relatively
large bias – the true PD is on the right tail. This vindicates that neglecting heterogeneity may lead to
downward biases in default risk measures for speculative ratings. However, the HHR estimator produces
tighter conﬁdence intervals than the NHHR estimator. For rating C, the sparse transition data within the
2-year windows leads to uncentered distributions with wide conﬁdence intervals for both estimators.
Table 7 reports summary statistics for the bootstrap distribution of the diﬀerential (￿ PDHHR−￿ PDNHHR).
[Table 7 around here]
For rating B, the 95% conﬁdence set does not contain zero thereby suggesting that the HHR and NHHR
estimates imply signiﬁcantly diﬀerent default risk – the HHR estimator underestimates the PD for rating B.
The mean/median estimates are similar for all other ratings. In terms of overall mobility or migration risk,
the two estimates are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In particular, the mobility implied by the NHHR matrix is
signiﬁcantly larger or equivalently, it contains more oﬀ-diagonal probability mass than the HHR matrix and
so the inferred migration risk from the latter is smaller. The upshot is that, if there is time heterogeneity in
the ratings DGP, disregarding it may produce misleading inferences on migration risk.
5 Properties of the Sovereign Rating Process
Transition matrix estimators typically assume that the credit ratings are driven by a Markov process. To the
best of our knowledge, the plausibility of the latter has not been assessed for sovereigns. In this section, we
attempt to ﬁll this gap in two ways. First, we test whether the transition matrix estimate conforms to the
homogeneous Markov structure. Second, we investigate the presence of momentum and duration eﬀects both
of which are at odds with the Markovian assumption and induce time heterogeneity in the rating process.
5.1 Does the Transition Matrix Conform to the Markov Structure?
Each row of the transition matrix P sums to one and so it follows that there exists a trivial unity eigenvalue
(q1 =1 )which is the largest in magnitude – the rating process reaches a steady state as time goes to inﬁnity.
The decay rate towards the steady state is dictated by the second largest eigenvalue (q2). It can be shown
that the eigenvector associated with q2 characterizes the asymptotic distribution of survivors (sovereigns not
19ending in default) and thus provides insights on their limit rating. For a process to be homogeneous Markov,
the eigenvalues of P associated with increasing horizons should decay exponentially (except for q1 which is
unity for all horizons) and the eigenvectors should remain constant. In other words, if q2 is the 2nd largest
eigenvalue of P for transition horizon ∆t, then ln(q2) = −C∆t for C>0. This log-linear relation has to
hold for all subsequent eigenvalues if the rating process driving P is Markov and time-homogeneous.
The second to ﬁfth largest eigenvalues of ˆ P for various horizons are plotted in Figure 6 (Panel A). The
transition matrices are estimated using equation (6). The graph strongly supports the log-linear relation.
[Figure 6 around here]
Figure 6 (Panel B) shows that the 2nd largest eigenvector of ˆ P is very similar across horizons. Moreover, the
distribution peaks at Aaa which suggests that the survivors tend to settle (long term) at the highest rating.
On the basis of this analysis, there is no evidence against the Markovian assumption.
5.2 Do Ratings Display Duration and Momentum Eﬀects?
The duration dependence hypothesis says that the time a sovereign stays in a given rating impacts the future
probability of transition to another rating. To test this hypothesis, panel logit models are estimated using
monthly sovereign credit ratings and durations over 23 years (March, 1981 to March, 2004). The duration
dit, recorded for each sovereign i at the end of every month t, is the time elapsed since the last transition to
the current rating. To illustrate, consider a sovereign that experienced a rating transition to Ba in June 2002,
then to B in September 2003 and has not moved since then. The duration in, say, June 2003 is 12 months
and in March 2004 it is 6 months. The rating process is assumed to start in March 1981 (left-censored
durations) which is not too restrictive because very few issuers had been rated before 1981. The duration
hypothesis is assessed separately for upgrades (UP) and downgrades (DW) by deﬁning the dummy variable
UPit =
￿
1 if sovereign i was upgraded in month t
0 otherwise
and likewise for DWit. The following logit regression is estimated for upgrades
y∗
it = α + βxit +γ
￿
zt +εit,ε it ∼ iid(0,σ 2
i), i = 1,...,N, t=1 ,...,T (11)
where y∗
it is a continuous latent variable such that UPit = 1 for y∗
it ≥ 0 and UPit = 0 otherwise (likewise
for DWit), xit ≡ dit and zt is 7×1 vector of yearly dummies 1998-2004 to signify that many emerging
20economies entered the sample after 1997. This model allows for heteroskedasticity because the error variance
will be relatively smaller for industrialized countries if their durations are more stable – the error variance is
permitted to diﬀer between industrialized and non-industrialized countries according to σi = [exp(ψ +ξrit)]
where ξ is a constant parameter and exp(ψ)= π √
3 with rit = 1 if i is industrial and rit = 0 otherwise. The
observed durations reveal that: a) the mean of dit increases with rating quality, the only exception being
the absorbing default rating, b) the variance of dit for top credit-quality ratings is relatively large but this is
a scale eﬀect (long durations) as the standard deviation/mean ratio bears out. For details see Appendix D.
Table 8 (Panel A) reports the maximum likelihood estimation results for the above logit model
[Table 8 around here]
The duration coeﬃcient is negative for both upgrades (ˆ β = −1.88) and downgrades (ˆ β = −1.66) which
suggests that migration probabilities are negatively inﬂuenced by duration – the longer a sovereign stays in
a given rating the less likely a migration is. These ﬁndings are consistent with those in Lando and Skodeberg
(2002) for corporates and can be attributed to the rating agencies’ reluctancy to take drastic actions in
favour of gradual (notch-by-notch) upgrades/downgrades. The latter results in short durations and high
migration risk for the low end of the rating scale and vice versa. Finally, note that although the estimated
error variance is higher for industrial countries this ﬁnding is insigniﬁcant – the positive sign of ˆ ξ may relate
to the high durations typical of top-quality ratings but, in standardized form, the durations are comparable
across ratings which explains the insigniﬁcance of ˆ ξ (for details see Appendix D).
The rating momentum hypothesis states that a sovereign being upgraded (downgraded) is more suscep-
tible to subsequently being upgraded (downgraded). To test this hypothesis for upgrades, we deﬁne the
upward momentum indicator over the last 24 months
UMit =
￿
1 if sovereign i was upgraded to the current rating over [t − 1,t − 23]
0 otherwise
and (11) is estimated using xit ≡ UMit. Likewise for downgrades.
The results are presented in Table 8 (Panel B). The downgrade logit model strongly supports the momen-
tum hypothesis with a highly signiﬁcant ˆ β at 1.20. This suggests that a downgrade in the previous two years
signiﬁcantly increases the current downgrade probability. These ﬁndings are in line with the extant evidence
for corporate debt (Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Nickell et al., 2000). Moreover, the residual variance is
21signiﬁcantly lower for industrialized countries (ˆ ξ = −0.17) w h i c hi si nl i n ew i t ht h e i rm o r es t a b l er a t i n g
history. The upgrade logit provides, however, no evidence of momentum.
What do we learn from these ﬁndings? On the one hand, the spectral analysis of the transition matrix
ˆ P provided no evidence against the assumption of Markovian ratings. On the other, the panel logit models
uncovered signiﬁcant duration and momentum eﬀects in sovereign ratings both of which imply non-Markovian
behaviour and non-time homogeneity as the current rating does not fully determine the transition probability.
Recent contributions in the corporate credit risk literature have introduced reﬁnements into hazard rate
estimators in order to accommodate momentum and duration eﬀects (Kavvathas, 2001; Christensen et al.,
2004; Koopman et al., 2005). However, these sophisticated estimators have not been applied in the context
of sovereigns as yet and this may be because of data limitations.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Sovereign credit ratings play a major role in modern credit risk management, valuation and capital allocation.
All these applications require transition matrices, namely, the default probabilities from each rating category
and the probabilities of transition between them. Diﬀerent estimators of transition matrices have been
proposed, however, their behaviour has been studied mainly in the context of corporate ratings. Very little
is known on the ﬁnite-sample properties of sovereign rating transition estimators. This paper contributes
to the literature in three directions. First, it compares three alternative estimators that assume a Markov
process for ratings – the discrete multinomial approach (industry standard) and two continuous hazard
rate approaches that diﬀer in how they deal with time heterogeneity. The discrete multinomial approach
is attractive because of its computational simplicity while the time-heterogeneous hazard rate approach lies
at the other extreme in terms of computational cost. The comparison is conducted through a parametric
bootstrap technique that provides the estimators’ empirical distribution. Second, we assess the validity of
the assumption that the rating evolutions are Markov and time homogeneous. For this purpose, we rely on
the spectral decomposition of the transition matrix estimates on the one hand, and on panel logit models to
speciﬁcally test for rating momentum and duration eﬀects on the other.
The analysis is based on a sample of Moody’s credit ratings 1981-2004 for 72 industrialized and emerging
economies. The default probabilities from continuous-time estimators are more reliable (smaller sampling
variability) and generally less biased that those from the discrete estimator. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences are
22also found in the overall migration risk implied by the estimators. The discrete transition matrices have a
larger concentration of probability mass around the main diagonal which may misleadingly suggest a high
degree of rating stability or low migration risk. This can be attributed to their eﬃciency loss in neglecting
the full information of exact transition dates and rating durations. There are also diﬀerences between the
homogeneous and heterogeneous hazard rate estimators and more so the wider the estimation window –
the longer the transition horizon the more noticeable the time heterogeneities become. The heterogenous
estimator appears less biased than the homogeneous counterpart for the default risk of non-investment grade
ratings. The default probabilities from the homogeneous estimator are downward biased. Interestingly, in
terms of sampling variability there are no gains in using the time-heterogeneous estimator.
The improved understanding of the ﬁnite-sample behaviour of transition probability estimators has con-
sequences for a number of issues in credit risk management and capital allocation. For instance, the Basel
Committee recently established a lower bound of 3bp as the minimum transition probability for rare events.
Our ﬁndings suggest that continuous estimators provide a more robust indication of the appropriateness
of such a limit, in particular, suggesting that it is rather conservative (too high) for the top credit-quality
sovereigns. Another relevant ﬁnding for ﬁnancial institutions and regulators, in the light of the New Basel
Accord, is that the choice between alternative estimators of sovereign default probabilities may be far from
innocuous in terms of the implied capital requirements. However, further research is warranted to establish
that the statistical diﬀerences here uncovered have economic signiﬁcance.
There is evidence of non-Markov eﬀects in the sovereign rating evolution. Panel logit models suggest
negative duration dependence for both downgrades and upgrades. Rating momentum is signiﬁcant for
downgrades but not for upgrades in line with the rating agencies’ practice of gradually reducing the credit
quality status. These ﬁndings have important implications for risk management. For instance, in terms of
pricing credit sensitive instruments, the rating duration and momentum of a sovereign may help to predict the
value of its debt obligations. Hence, an issue that warrants investigation is whether duration and momentum
are priced in sovereign debt or alternatively, whether there is scope for arbitrage. Finally, it may be fruitful
to assess the incremental value of more reﬁned estimators that account for momentum and duration eﬀects
in sovereign ratings. In particular, there is the issue of whether such estimators are feasible, given the sparse
rating transition data for sovereigns, and if so what are the eﬃciency gains.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Observed Sovereign Ratings  
The figure shows the distribution of the sample (Moody’s) ratings aggregated over all 
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Figure 2. Empirical Distribution of Continuous and Discrete Default Probability Estimators (Investment Grade Ratings)
Rating Aaa Rating Aa Rating A
Rating Baa Rating Baa
The figure reports the Gaussian kernel density estimate of the simulated default probability for the continuous homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator








































































































Figure 3. Empirical Distribution of Continuous/Discrete Default Probability Estimators (Non-investment Grade)
The figure reports the Gaussian kernel density estimate of the simulated default probability for the continuous homogeneous
hazard rate (HHR) estimator and the discrete multinomial (DM) estimator.
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Figure 4. Empirical Distribution of Continuous Default Probability Estimators (Investment Grade Ratings)
Rating A Rating A
Rating Baa Rating Baa
The figure reports the Gaussian kernel density estimate of the simulated default probability for the continuous




































































































































Figure 5.  Empirical Distribution of Continuous Default Probability Estimators (Non-Investment Grade)
The figure reports the Gaussian kernel density estimate of the simulated default probability for the continuous
homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator and the non-homogeneous hazard rate (NHHR) estimator.
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Figure 6. Spectral Decomposition of Transition Probability Matrix 
 
Panel A reports the second to fifth largest eigenvalues of the historical transition probabilitiy 
matrix for horizons 1-4 years. Panel B reports the second eigenvector for horizons 1-4 years. Table 1
1-Year Historical Transition Matrix (Time-Homogeneous Estimators)
i) Discrete multinomial (DM) estimator
Transition probabilities
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B C D
Aaa 0.944444 0.055556 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.063954 0.924419 0.011628 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.000000 0.041237 0.886598 0.061856 0.010309 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Baa 0.000000 0.000000 0.100000 0.854545 0.027273 0.018182 0.000000 0.033333
Ba 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.075758 0.833333 0.068182 0.015152 0.007576
B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.071429 0.845238 0.023810 0.059523
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.333333 0.500000 0.166667
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
ii) Continuous homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
Transition intensities
Aaa -0.060311 0.060311 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.063454 -0.074991 0.011537 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.000000 0.038984 -0.116953 0.077969 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Baa 0.000000 0.000000 0.100857 -0.159690 0.058833 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Ba 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.080268 -0.189724 0.102159 0.000000 0.007297
B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.080422 -0.195310 0.068933 0.045955
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.302905 -0.757261 0.454357
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Transition probabilities
Aaa 0.943265 0.056406 0.000320 0.000320 1.2×10−7 2.4×10−9 3.1×10−11 1.9×10−10
Aa 0.059346 0.929742 0.010503 0.000401 0.000008 2.0×10−7 2.3×10−9 1.6×10−8
A 0.001138 0.035490 0.893283 0.068048 0.001967 0.000067 0.000001 0.000006
Baa 0.000038 0.001751 0.088024 0.857808 0.049576 0.002529 0.000050 0.000223
Ba 7.4×10−7 0.000046 0.003472 0.067639 0.832584 0.085502 0.002450 0.008307
B 1.2×10−8 9.2×10−7 0.000092 0.002703 0.066808 0.837991 0.043687 0.048718
C 6.8×10−10 5.2×10−8 6.7×10−6 0.000257 0.009356 0.225019 0.475650 0.289712
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
The estimates are based on Moody’s ratings 1981-2004 for 72 countries. Both estimators
assume time-homogeneity (over the span of the sample) in the rating migration process.
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Empirical Distribution of 1-year Default Probabilities (Time-Homogeneous Estimators)
Panel A: Discrete Multinomial (DM) estimator
Rating True PD Mean(￿ PD) Median(￿ PD) StDev(￿ PD) 95% Conf. Int. Mean Bias Median Bias
Aaa 1.9×10−10 0 0 0 [0, 0] -1.89×10−10 -1.89×10−10
Aa1 . 6 ×10−8 000 [0, 0] -1.58×10−8 -1.58×10−8
A 5.6×10−6 000 [0, 0] -5.56×10−6 -5.56×10−6
Baa 0.0002226 0.0002696 0 0.001502 [0, 0.007520] 0.00004700 -0.0002226
Ba 0.008307 0.008905 0.007519 0.008086 [0, 0.02801] 0.0005980 -0.0007883
B 0.04872 0.04661 0.04412 0.02596 [0, 0.1067] -0.002110 -0.004600
C 0.2897 0.2761 0.2500 0.2591 [0, 1] -0.01360 -0.03971
Panel B: Continuous Homogeneous Hazard Rate (HHR) estimator
Rating True PD Mean(￿ PD) Median(￿ PD) StDev(￿ PD) 95% Conf. Int. Mean Bias Median Bias
Aaa 1.9×10−10 2.3×10−10 8.8×10−11 3.5×10−10 [0, 1.2×10−9]3 . 5 ×10−11 -1.01×10−11
Aa1 . 6 ×10−8 1.8×10−8 7.8×10−9 2.7×10−8 [0, 9×10−8]2 . 6 ×10−9 -7.99×10−9
A 5.6×10−6 6.6×10−6 5.1×10−6 6.8×10−6 [1.8×10−7,2 . 4 ×10−5]9 . 9 ×10−7 -4.91×10−7
Baa 0.0002226 0.0002701 0.0002150 0.0002625 [1.1×10−5, 0.0009718] 0.00004748 -7.59×10−6
Ba 0.008307 0.01003 0.009177 0.007823 [0.0007534, 0.02963] 0.001727 0.0008696
B 0.04872 0.05861 0.05364 0.04568 [0.01333, 0.1204] 0.009890 0.004923
C 0.2897 0.3220 0.3078 0.1882 [0, 0.7488] 0.03231 0.01808
True PD refers to the historical probabilities of default, signiﬁed in bold in Table 1, adopted as parameter values in
the ratings DGP for the bootstrap simulations. The bias is deﬁned as the estimated value minus the true value.Table 3
Empirical Distribution of Continuous versus Discrete Estimator
Panel A: 1-year default probability
Rating Mean(∆d PD)S t D e v ( ∆d PD) 95% Conf. Int.
Bootstrap test
H0:∆PD =0
Aaa 2.3×10−10 3.5×10−10 [0, 1.2×10−9] Not reject
Aa 1.8×10−8 2.7×10−8 [0, 9×10−8] Not reject
A6 . 6 ×10−6 6.8×10−6 [1.8×10−7,2 . 4 ×10−5] Reject
Baa 4.8×10−7 0.001486 [-0.006857, 0.000946] Not reject
Ba 0.001129 0.004858 [-0.01078, 0.01024] Not reject
B 0.01200 0.03948 [-0.01468, 0.04364] Not reject
C 0.04557 0.2171 [-0.3796, 0.5269] Not reject
Panel B: Overall migration risk
ˆ m ∆ˆ m Mean(∆ˆ m) StDev(∆ˆ m) 95% Conf. Int. H0:∆m =0
0.1921(HHR) -0.003257 -0.09424 0.04160 [-0.1801, -0.03485] Reject
0.1954(DM)
∆PD is the continuous homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) default probability minus the
discrete multinomial (DM) default probability. Likewise for the mobility diﬀerential ∆m.
Both the DM and HHR estimator assume time homogeneity in the rating process.
32Table 4
2-Year and 3-Year Historical Transition Probabilities (Homogeneous Estimators)
Panel A: 2-year transition horizon
Discrete multinomial (DM) estimator
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B C D
Aaa 0.893939 0.106061 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.132530 0.843373 0.024096 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.000000 0.093023 0.837209 0.046512 0.023256 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Baa 0.000000 0.000000 0.192308 0.730769 0.038462 0.019230 0.000000 0.019231
Ba 0.000000 0.000000 0.015873 0.126984 0.730159 0.111111 0.015873 0.000000
B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.025641 0.128205 0.717949 0.025641 0.102564
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Continuous homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
Aaa 0.893097 0.105661 0.001181 0.000059 0.000002 6.4×10−8 2.0×10−9 5.9×10−9
Aa 0.111168 0.868141 0.019202 0.001432 0.000054 0.000003 5.0×10−8 2.5×10−7
A 0.004199 0.064883 0.804324 0.119306 0.006774 0.000456 0.000013 0.000044
Baa 0.000272 0.006259 0.154329 0.745187 0.084146 0.008588 0.000293 0.000927
Ba 0.000011 0.000323 0.011955 0.114803 0.702356 0.144981 0.007061 0.018510
B 3.2×10−7 0.000013 0.000629 0.009133 0.112473 0.726370 0.057355 0.094027
C 4.3×10−8 0.000001 0.000089 0.001621 0.029437 0.345947 0.241067 0.381837
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Panel B: 3-year transition horizon
Discrete multinomial (DM) estimator
Aaa 0.825000 0.175000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.200000 0.763636 0.036364 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.000000 0.153846 0.730769 0.076923 0.038462 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Baa 0.000000 0.000000 0.233333 0.633333 0.066667 0.033333 0.000000 0.033333
Ba 0.000000 0.000000 0.050000 0.150000 0.6000000 0.175000 0.025000 0.000000
B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.052632 0.105263 0.789474 0.052632 0.000000
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Continuous homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
Aaa 0.848700 0.148655 0.002456 0.000181 0.000008 4.0×10−7 2.3×10−8 4.3×10−8
Aa 0.156403 0.814102 0.026432 0.002888 0.000160 0.000012 2.0×10−7 0.000001
A 0.008732 0.089315 0.729704 0.157549 0.013178 0.001316 0.000062 0.000143
Baa 0.000831 0.012623 0.203798 0.655469 0.107861 0.016567 0.000653 0.002197
Ba 0.000048 0.000955 0.023257 0.147158 0.600462 0.186280 0.012676 0.029163
B 0.000002 0.000058 0.001808 0.017542 0.143519 0.649375 0.052951 0.134745
C 4.9×10−7 0.000006 0.000402 0.004196 0.054507 0.399945 0.186006 0.354937
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Panel C: Overall migration risk for increasing time horizon
Horizon (years) ˆ m(HHR)ˆ m(DM) ∆ˆ m(HHR-DM)
1 0.1921 0.1954 -0.0033
2 0.3155 0.3916 -0.0761
3 0.3802 0.4661 -0.0859
33Table 5
2-Year and 3-Year Historical Transition Probabilities (Continuous Estimators)
Panel A: 2-year transition horizon
Non-homogeneous hazard rate (NHHR) estimator
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B C D
Aaa 0.920163 0.079837 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.171438 0.803105 0.025457 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.003365 0.061066 0.786007 0.138133 0.010760 0.000670 0.000000 0.000000
Baa 0.000000 0.001871 0.156406 0.717529 0.119186 0.004890 0.000059 0.000059
Ba 0.000000 0.000068 0.013681 0.103379 0.728159 0.130877 0.004754 0.019082
B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000160 0.005250 0.111325 0.773815 0.028853 0.080597
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.161111 0.670635 0.168254
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
Aaa 0.959259 0.040741 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.096440 0.887919 0.015641 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
A 0.001886 0.029711 0.887680 0.078201 0.002398 0.000112 0.000004 0.000007
Baa 0.000121 0.000790 0.081537 0.858642 0.056745 0.001957 0.000065 0.000144
Ba 0.000004 0.000031 0.003377 0.061053 0.853624 0.070544 0.002444 0.008924
B 0.000001 4.6×10−8 0.000158 0.003381 0.056722 0.867210 0.032466 0.040061
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000003 0.000240 0.004266 0.078548 0.789233 0.127710
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Panel B: 3-year transition horizon
Non-homogeneous hazard rate (NHHR) estimator
Aaa 0.897042 0.102958 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.247916 0.715125 0.036959 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aaa 0.004773 0.085455 0.750384 0.144077 0.013085 0.001625 0.000021 0.000580
Baa 0.000000 0.002713 0.226937 0.582570 0.176119 0.009498 0.000164 0.001998
Ba 0.000000 0.000286 0.027437 0.122774 0.621346 0.194436 0.007403 0.026319
B 0.000000 0.000052 0.004123 0.011141 0.133116 0.706878 0.039027 0.105663
C 0.000000 0.000000 0.000170 0.002212 0.046899 0.199579 0.505503 0.245638
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator
Aaa 0.961241 0.038759 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Aa 0.113318 0.868130 0.018179 0.000365 0.000007 6.7×10−8 8.8×10−10 8.8×10−10
A 0.002393 0.037180 0.873991 0.083385 0.002881 0.000159 0.000007 0.000005
Baa 0.000157 0.001286 0.085887 0.842212 0.068326 0.001951 0.000101 0.000080
Ba 0.000004 0.000049 0.003032 0.049545 0.857125 0.083717 0.003419 0.003109
B 1.2×10−7 0.000002 0.000131 0.001896 0.034591 0.869301 0.041519 0.052561
C 2.1×10−8 1.9×10−7 0.000021 0.000362 0.009194 0.141598 0.620984 0.227840
D 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000
Panel C: Overall migration risk for increasing time horizon
Horizon (years) ˆ m(HHR)ˆ m(NHHR) ∆ˆ m(NHHR-HHR)
1 0.1219 0.1303 0.0084
2 0.1352 0.2399 0.1047
3 0.1718 0.3146 0.1428
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Empirical Distribution of 2-year Default Probabilities (Continuous Estimators)
Panel A: Homogeneous Hazard Rate (HHR) estimator
Rating True PD Mean(￿ PD) StDev(￿ PD) Median(￿ PD) 95% Conf. Int. Mean Bias Median Bias
Aaa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A4 . 8 ×10−6 8.5×10−6 1.3×10−5 4.3×10−6 [0, 4.3×10−5]3 . 7 ×10−6 -4.9×10−7
Baa 1.2×10−4 0.0001625 0.0001979 0.00009753 [0, 0.0006900] 4.2×10−5 -2.3×10−5
Ba 0.02519 0.009670 0.007105 0.008813 [0.0006235, 0.02601] -0.01552 -0.01638
B 0.09319 0.04327 0.01940 0.04068 [0.01313, 0.08646] -0.04992 -0.05251
C 0.2232 0.1095 0.06122 0.1079 [0, 0.2437] -0.1137 -0.1154
Panel B: Non-Homogeneous Hazard Rate (NHHR) Estimator
Rating True PD Mean(￿ PD) StDev(￿ PD) Median(￿ PD) 9 5 %C o n f .I n t . M e a nB i a sM e d i a nB i a s
Aaa 0 0 0 0 [0, 0] 0 0
Aa 0 0 0 0 [0, 0] 0 0
A4 . 8 ×10−6 3.7×10−6 1.7×10−5 0 [0, 4.5×10−5]- 1 . 1 ×10−6 -4.8×10−6
Baa 1.2×10−4 0.0001218 0.0002324 0 [0, 0.0007751] 1.7×10−6 -0.0001202
Ba 0.02519 0.02390 0.01384 0.02305 [0.002650, 0.05420] -0.001292 -0.002139
B 0.09319 0.09017 0.03512 0.08712 [0.02992, 0.1674] -0.003022 -0.006063
C 0.2232 0.1690 0.09032 0.1673 [0, 0.3522] -0.05425 -0.05589
True PD refers to the default probabilities (sample estimates) adopted as parameter values in the time-heterogeneous
bootstrap DGP. The bias is deﬁned as the estimated value minus the true value.Table 7
Empirical Distribution of Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous Estimator
Panel A: 2-year default probability
Rating Mean(∆d PD) StDev(∆d PD) 95% Conf. Int.
Bootstrap Test
H0:∆PD=0
Aaa 0 0 0 _
Aa 0 0 0 _
A -4.8×10−6 2×10−5 [-4×10−5,3 . 5 ×10−5] Not reject
Baa -4.1×10−5 0.0002902 [-0.0006211, 0.0006058] Not reject
Ba 0.01423 0.009264 [-0.0002048, 0.03332] Not reject
B 0.04689 0.02326 [0.007110, 0.09616] Reject
C 0.05947 0.06409 [-0.04547, 0.2122] Notreject
Panel B: Overall migration risk
ˆ m ∆ˆ m Mean(∆ˆ m) StDev(∆ˆ m) 95% Conf. Int. H0:∆m =0
0.2399(NHHR) 0.1047 0.08104 0.01623 [0.05331, 0.1201] Reject
0.1352(HHR)
∆PD is the non-homogeneous hazard rate (NHHR) default probability minus the homo-
geneous hazard rate (HHR) default probability. Likewise for the mobility diﬀerential ∆m.
36Table 8
Logit Estimates and Tests for Non-Markov Eﬀects
Panel A: Duration eﬀect
Upgrade Downgrade
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio
β duration -1.88 -5.33 -1.66 -5.74
γ1 1998 1.99 2.71 -0.31 -0.37
γ1 1999 0.48 0.39 1.68 3.12
γ2 2000 1.36 1.69 1.49 2.62
γ3 2001 3.81 4.88 0.37 0.43
γ4 2002 2.39 2.89 1.94 2.70
γ5 2003 3.78 5.67 -0.08 -0.12
γ6 2004 -0.44 -0.67 -0.90 -1.66
α constant -1.57 -1.50 -0.41 -1.15
ξ heterosk. 0.27 1.04 0.11 0.44
Panel B: Momentum eﬀect
Upgrade Downgrade
Coeﬃcient Eﬀect Estimate t ratio Estimate t ratio
β rating drift -1.24 -1.02 1.20 2.94
γ1 1998 1.65 2.75 -0.37 -0.46
γ2 1999 0.60 0.71 1.21 2.67
γ3 2000 0.84 1.19 0.71 1.47
γ4 2001 1.83 3.23 -0.79 -0.99
γ5 2002 0.84 1.16 0.35 0.63
γ6 2003 2.61 5.47 -0.28 -0.45
γ7 2004 0.90 1.08 -0.08 -0.12
α constant -6.37 -14.46 -5.18 -14.06
ξ heterosk. -0.027 -0.35 -0.17 -2.10
The table reports maximum likelihood estimates based on monthly ratings 1981m3-2004m3.
The logit models in Panel A (B) represent the probability of rating migration as a function
of duration (rating drift). γj, j=1,...,7 are year dummies and α is the intercept. A positive
(negative) ξ indicates that the error variance is higher (lower) for industrialized countries.
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